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Abstract
The terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US
foreign policy. In this environment the Bush
administration crafted what came to be
known as the Bush Doctrine. Though a precise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains
contested, definitions typically include the
idea that the United States may preemptively attack countries harboring terrorists,
and that the US should support the spread of
democracy. But, after eight years, the
United States is not safer. This paper analyzes democratization as a theory and as an
element of the Bush Doctrine through case
studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. By tying
the notion of victory in the War on Terror to
democratization, the United States has angered many Afghanis and Iraqis, wasted an
enormous amount of resources, and damaged its relations with other countries. Overall, efforts by the Bush administration to
impose democracy in these countries have
counterproductive at combating terrorism. I
conclude with policy prescriptions for the
Obama administration, namely that America
must remove itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties
with the international community, and develop a strategy for complete American
withdrawal from these areas.
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Since September 11, 2001 terrorism
has been a chief concern of American national security. The days of US protection
from foreign threats because of its geography are long gone. Al Qaeda displayed not
only its ability to attack the United States,
but that it was capable of doing so from
American soil. From lone snipers to anthrax delivered through the mail, Americans
became acutely aware of the potential for
additional terrorist attacks. Fortunately,
many experts agree that terrorists generally
lack the logistical capabilities necessary to
inflict mass casualties. Unfortunately, terrorists are constantly working to overcome
these obstacles. Instead of conducting grandiose attacks, terrorists may use smaller,
inexpensive strikes that require low levels
of technical expertise and training. Regrettably, states (especially liberal democracies
like the United States) have great difficulty
countering this approach toward violence.
States are bound by international norms and
laws. Democracies like the United States
are further constrained in the application of
violence and surveillance in counterterrorism by popular consent. Given the ability of
terrorist organizations to adapt and overcome state defenses, alternative methods are
needed for states to preserve their national
security from terrorist attacks.
In this environment, the Bush administration crafted what would later
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become known as the Bush Doctrine. Although the precise definition of the Bush Doctrine is still in
dispute, definitions typically include
legitimizing preemptive strikes against
perceived aggressors and using United
States—supported democratization as a
weapon in the “War on Terror” (for example, see Monten 2005). American backed
democratization is a particularly interesting
element of the War on Terror because it was
a subtle tool capable of changing both government and citizenry. However, despite attempts by the Bush administration to use
democratization to further its foreign policy
agenda of eliminating terrorism, democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved
disastrous. In this paper, I will show how
despite rational theoretical backing, problems resulting from the pledge to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly diminished America’s capability to wage the
War on Terror.
Definitions and Terms
For this study, it is important that the
language used be a clear as possible. Thus,
for the purpose of this essay, I must define
several words. Essential to my argument is
democratization. For this term, I borrow a
definition from Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder’s book Electing to Fight. To democratize is to, “try to create favorable institutional conditions in the sequence most likely
to foster successful, peaceful democratic
transitions” (2007, 16). This definition is
exceptional because it identifies the essence
of democracy (governance with popular sovereignty rested in the will of the people);
but, does not necessitate a successful transition to democracy. This is important be-
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cause, despite best intentions, there is no
guarantee that democratization will actually
result in the formation of a democratic state.
This is very logical. Since it is impossible to
predict the future, how can a reasonable
definition of democratization be contingent
on the emergence of a democratic state?
Additionally, within the span of human history, no state is eternal. While the United
States has been a relatively stable democracy
for over the past 150 years, there is no guarantee that autocracy will not prevail in 100
years. It would be unfair to discount the
long history of American democracy because of the potential emergence of an autocratic state in the future. The central argument of this paper regards the problems associated with continued American presence
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, to understand the motivations for continuous American involvement in these two countries, it is
vital to perceive democratization as a process rather than a result.
War on Terror is the next important
term to define. War on Terrorism, Global
War on Terrorism, War on Terror, and terrorist are terms that were widely used by the
Bush administration to describe and define
its counterterrorist activities since 9-11. One
of the largest obstacles to any serious study
of US policy since this time has been the
disambiguation of such confusing language.
Discouragingly, the Bush administration
made no effort to clarify its terms. In fact, in
the case of prisoner detentions at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush administration intentionally obfuscated these
terms to provide leeway in gathering intelligence (Hersh 2004, 264). Thus, since the
Bush administration has not identified

111
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/10

2

Duhe: Imposing Democracy

Great Day 2009
precise definitions, we must therefore look towards a practical usage.
For this paper, I adapt Bruce Hoffman’s definition and define terrorism as
any attack conducted by a substate actor
with the intent to cause fear in a given
population achieve as an end (Hoffman
2006, 33). A “terrorist” is any person who
commits an act of terrorism. Finally, terror
is an emotion that can be evoked through
acts of terrorism.
The decision to limit terrorism to the
attacks of substate actors is very intentional.
Admittedly, this is a hotly debated topic in
the field of counterterrorism. Many argue
some states have intentionally attacked civilians with the intention of instilling fear just
like a substate actor would. Proponents of
this belief might argue that actions by Nazis
in concentration camps during the Holocaust
should be considered terrorism just like the
actions of the 9-11 hijackers; all human suffering caused by terrorism is equal. Thus,
some might perceive separation between
state—sponsored terrorism and substate terrorism, as unnecessary, ultimately reducing
the effectiveness of counterterrorism at combating human suffering. However, allowing
state sponsored terrorism into this discussion
will becloud the topic at hand. The states of
interest in my investigation are Afghanistan
and Iraq. Prior to the American invasion in
these countries, governments were brutally
authoritarian. Both states would frequently
commit horrible acts against citizens with
the intent of inciting fear. Thus, the two
groups must be separated if only to distinguish the actions of the former Iraqi and Afghani regimes from the actions of current
substate groups currently in these countries.
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Obviously Global War on Terrorism, and the War on Terrorism do not connote the same thing. Furthermore, neither of
these terms act45ually describes American
counterterrorist policy since September 11,
2001. To be at war with terrorism is to be at
war with an action. In this sense, an analogous policy to the War on Terrorism is the
equally ineptly named American War on Illegal Immigration. Both illegal immigration
and terrorism are abstract concepts. Although one might be able to identify a perpetrator of terrorism just as one may be able to
identify an illegal immigrant, it is impossible
to single out illegal immigration or terrorism. Because it is intangible, terrorism cannot be fought on a battlefield. One could attack terrorism insofar as the causes of terrorism could be eliminated, but attacking terrorism itself does not really mean anything.
Because of this, neither of these terms will
be used in my paper.
It is worth mentioning that another
problem with the phrase Global War on Terrorism is that it alludes to US counterterrorist activity on a scale that it much larger than
reality. America has made no great effort to
eliminate terrorist movements that do not
threaten US interests. For example, US activity to destroy the PPK or the Tamil Tigers
has been notoriously absent from the War.
Some may argue that this absence is actually
a tactic in itself (Byman 2009, 472). By not
going to war against all terrorism everywhere, the United States is less likely to
draw the ire of terrorist groups that might
otherwise have left America alone. Really,
the War on Terror is with the terrorists who
seek to harm to the United States. For all
these reasons, Global War on Terror is an
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inappropriate term to describe U.S.
policy since 9-11.
I argue that War on Terror is the
most suitable term to describe current
US action. First, War on terror eliminates ambiguity in distinguishing between
a terrorist and a freedom fighter who employs terrorism. It treats both of these groups
the same. So long as a person uses terror to
advance his agenda he is a terrorist and may
be attacked by the United States. Furthermore, war on terror does not imply intent to
eliminate terrorism itself. This is a necessary element in any description of current
US counterterrorist policy since terrorism, as
was just discussed, is virtually impossible to
eliminate.
I would be remiss to ignore the recent change in recent policy changes made
by the Obama administration regarding terminology. In March 2009, the Obama administration stated it was removing the term
Global War on Terrorism and all similar
terms from the lexicon of United States foreign policy (Baker 2009). Interestingly, the
phrase chosen to replace War on Terror is
Overseas Contingency Operation. Such a
gesture was certainly intended to eliminate
the implication that the United States is at
war with Islam, and to break from the unending dedication of American resources to
counterterrorism. As will be discussed later,
I can certainly agree with these goals. However, the new term the Obama administration has chosen is not particularly good either. Breaking down the phrase, the first
word is rather misleading. While it may be
true that many of the fronts in the War on
Terror are across the ocean, this is certainly
not always the case. The idea to form the
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Department of Homeland Security, was created immediately following 9-11, and was
intended to “create a comprehensive and
shared” national vision for the purpose of
“defeating terrorism” (Office of Homeland
Security 2002, i). The Bush administration
correctly viewed the need for both domestic
and international efforts to eliminate terrorism. By renaming the War on Terror as an
overseas activity, appreciation for the utility
of a two-pronged approach to fighting terrorists may be forgotten. The word
“Contingency” is mystifying. For what activity is the exercise of American might
strength a contingency? Diplomacy against
terrorist is not an option. As stated, substate
actors are less susceptible to the sticks and
carrots of traditional diplomacy. The only
word that accurately describes U.S. policy is
Operation, which is really a meaningless
term on its own. Since this term does a very
poor job at actually describing American
policy, I believe it would be best to continue
using the term War on Terror.
American Motivations
Let us now turn to the reasons for US
democratization. After all, there must have
been some purpose to the efforts that have
now cost the United States almost $864 billion (United States Congress Congressional
Research Service, 16). A historical approach is best for understanding current motives. Realpolitick has typically guided
American efforts at regime change (Pie
Minxin, Amin Samia, and Garz Seth 2006,
64). “Only [since the early twentieth century has America’s political ideals and its
need to sustain domestic support for] nationbuilding compelled it to try to establish democratic rule in target nations.” (Pie et al.
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2006, 65) To look beyond such
gross simplifications of US policy
as, “blood for oil,” the Bush administration’s motives for invading and democratizing Iraq and Afghanistan certainly included security. Afghanistan had
been the safe haven for al Qaeda under the
Taliban. In fact, al Qaeda underwent much
of its organizational development in Afghanistan during the 1980s while fighting
the Soviets. In what turned out to be a tragic
irony, much of al Qaeda’s development occurred as a direct result of American armament and training of mujahedeen during the
Soviet Invasion (Bhutto 2008, 112-114). As
al Qaeda was discovered to be the principal
organizer of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it was no surprise that the
United States saw Afghanistan as a major
battleground in the War on Terror.
The case of Iraq was a bit more complicated. Initially, the United States claimed
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) it had acquired through a
covert weapons development program
(Galbraith 2006, 70). Had this been the
case, Iraq would have been in violation of
numerous international laws; notably,
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 678 and 1441 which all explicitly
forbade Iraq from possessing or developing
WMDs after the 1991 Gulf War. This
breach of international law is obviously serious, but even if Iraq had possessed such
weapons, it lacked the delivery system necessary to attack the U.S such as intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Nevertheless, the Bush administration argues that the Iraqi government under
Saddam Hussein had the potential for selling
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or distributing WMDs to enemies of America. Admittedly, this was rather unlikely.
The secular Arab-nationalist Ba’ath Party
(Iraq’s governing party) would have been a
strange bedfellow for the Sunni Islamist al
Qaeda. An example of this disconnect is
exemplified by Osama bin Laden’s offer to
Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud of
the use of al Qaeda forces to defend Saudi
Arabia from Iraq during the first Gulf War.
Although the offer was not accepted, it underscores the acrimonious relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the
Bush administration argued that an Iraqi alliance with al Qaeda against the United States
was possible, thereby exacerbating American fear of terrorism. Given the stakes in
nuclear conflicts, the fear created by the
Bush administration was strong enough to
cull dissent, even from many Democrats in
Congress (Althaus and Largio 2006, 4). No
American wanted to be responsible for opposing regime change in Iraq if the connection between the two groups were true.
In both cases, United States policy
was to effect regime change. The Taliban
was deposed because of the asylum it
granted to al Qaeda operative. Former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein, the President of
a country the United States believed was in
contravention of international law and conspiring with terrorists, was removed from
power as well. But once the dust settled after the invasions, new governments were
needed for the two countries. To strengthen
its national security, the United States
needed to ensure that any successor government would be friendlier towards the United
States than its predecessor. One possibility
was for American instillation of a
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dictatorship (as had been the hallmark of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War). However, American officials likely realized the danger
in empowering dictators in already unstable countries particularly given the nature of terrorism. Arguably, support of dictatorships and authoritarianism was what led
to the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq in
the first place. Instead, the Bush administration turned to democratization as the answer
to its security dilemma.
Forging a Democratic Peace
In his essay “Perpetual Peace” written in 1795, the political philosopher Immanuel Kant outlined what he believed
would be necessary to stop states from going
to war with one another. Although the terminology differs slightly between Kant’s
time and today, he essentially argued for
three things: that all countries to democratize, that the depth and number of involvements of states in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) increase, and that international trade increase (Kant [1795] 1970, 9398). Kant reasoned that democracies only
tend to go to war in self defense (Kant
[1795] 1970, 98). Thus, if all countries were
democracies, there would be no war.
A democratic Iraq and Afghanistan
would certainly not have been the end to all
war everywhere. Nevertheless, the Bush
administration reasoned that if these countries became democratic, they would absorb
democratic ideals, and be likely to attack, or
support attacks perpetrated against, the
United States (Gause III, 2005). Of course,
changing the “hearts and minds” of potential
terrorist was an important goal. A strictly
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state-focused approach would not necessarily have influenced subgovernmental terrorist groups. Theoretically however, encouraging democracy would also help diminish
the potential for terrorism. The diminished
potential would be through the growth of
robust civil societies. The London School of
Economics provides an excellent definition
of civil society as, “the arena of uncoerced
collective action around shared interests,
purposes and values. Civil society is theoretically divorced from activities of the state,
though in practice, this relationship may be
negotiated” (London School of Economics,
2004). This concept is certainly familiar to
Americans. From local religious groups to
political action groups, Americans participate in many different manifestations of civil
society. Important to this discussion is that
many groups in civil society seek to effect
change. Civil society provides a medium
through which citizens can express discontent with the status quo without resorting to
violence. Furthermore, to extrapolate from
the theories of Ashtoush Varshney, the associations created by civil society might even
help prevent the emergence of violence
amongst Iraqis. This was an important consideration because of the deconstructed
power relationship during the former Hussein regime between ruling Sunni and the
demographically dominant Shi’a (not to
mention the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Thus, in
the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan
invasions, the United States began reestablishing the two countries as democracies.
To their credit, the Bush administration realized some of the serious roadblocks
to democracy in these two states, and did
attempt to remove them. Immediately after
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the invasions, the Bush administration lifted many of its trade barriers
with Iraq and Afghanistan. Theoretically, this enabled more international
trade for the two countries. Furthermore, the United States brought in the
Army Corps of Engineers and hired over
180,000 independent contractors to assist in
the reconstruction of state infrastructure. As
of August 2008 this has cost the United
States Government over $100 billion for
Iraq alone (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 16). Ironically much of the infrastructure had been
destroyed either as a direct result of American attacks during the invasion or by indigenous pillaging immediately following them.
Assisting in infrastructure projects supported
the development of business, in turn, promoting international trade. Furthermore, by
providing Iraqis with basic amenities, the
United States was clearly reaching out to the
Iraqi polity in the hopes that a future elected
government would not be explicitly antiAmerican.
The situation in Afghanistan was
even worse than the situation in Iraq. Larry
Goodson explains, “After conflict or regime
change, societies usually require some degree of reconstruction… but the destruction
in Afghanistan in late 2001 was far beyond
what is usually encountered in such disrupted societies” (2006, 153). Because of
this major issue, the United States relied on
anti-Taliban groups to establish a process for
transitioning sovereignty of Afghanistan to a
freely-elected Afghan government rather
than a US led coalition force (Goodson
2006, 157). This process, as laid out in the
Bonn Accords, was obviously a pivotal step

in establishing democracy in Afghanistan.
Democratic governance is impossible without a democratically elected government.
By relying on local Afghanis to establish
democracy, the United States – specifically
the military – was free to fighting Taliban
forces in the Afghan countryside. However,
the lack of benchmarks for successful democratization combined with the inability of
the United States to eradicate the Taliban
from Afghanistan has prolonged the American presence without any end in sight.
Democratic Peace Theory (DPT)
may have been a feasible solution for stopping terrorism, so long as it was executed
properly. Although invasion and subsequent
democratization are inherently state-level
actions, the Bush administration believed
these methods better than the alternative of
trying to root out specific terrorist organizations. To a degree, they were correct. It is
very difficult to completely destroy a terrorist group. First, simply finding a group may
prove problematic. Obviously, as a subgovernmental group, there is no terrorist “state.”
Nor is there necessarily a need for one.
With the advent of high-speed internet and
the pervasiveness of telecommunications,
terrorists can live virtually anywhere. Nevertheless, terrorist groups are attracted to
weak and failed states such as Afghanistan
or post-invasion Iraq (Gvosdev and Takeyh.
2009, 80). Weak and failed states may either be too weak to eliminate terrorists, or
may even collude with certain organizations.
This relationship provides terrorists with official documentation such as visas for travel,
and provides a safe haven during the counterterrorist offensives of other countries.
This was certainly the case for Afghanistan
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which, under the Taliban, had
worked with al Qaeda to train the
Afghan military from 1997-2001
(Wright 2006, 355). For countries like
the United States, the protection afforded to terrorist groups in weak and
failed states from international norms respect state sovereignty can seriously infringe
on effective counterterrorist campaigns
(Patrick 2009, 102).
Another problem for most counterterrorist activity is identifying the organizational structure of terrorist organizations.
Unlike the hierarchical style of “old terrorism,” “new terrorism” is characterized by its
nodal quality. Cells operate independently,
and there is no direct links up or down a
chain of command. Lacking the ability to
link one terrorist to another, it is almost impossible to determine the size and leadership
of a terrorist group. Furthermore, since the
cells operate independently, “leadership”
may even be an antiquated concept in the
organizational structure of terrorist groups.
When the United States attacked Afghanistan, and killed or capture many of who it
believed to be top al Qaeda leaders, the
movement did not die. In fact, as of this
writing, Taliban forces have conquered
much of the Swat region, just over the border in Pakistan. Even with Osama bin Laden
in hiding, branches of al Qaeda live on and
continue to fight and recruit. This resiliency
combined with other qualities of new terrorism such as religious motivations and a desire to maximize casualties calls for a nonstate focused response (Howard 2009, 113).
Since terrorists do not control states, they
cannot be dealt with through coercion or
tribute. To them, victory is zero-sum. Ad-
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mittedly, the very notion of a “new” terrorism versus and “old” terrorism is debated.
However, the characteristics of the terrorists
fought in the War on Terror resemble “new
terrorists” rather than “old terrorists.” This is
why I distinguish between the two groups.
It was not entirely unreasonable for
the Bush administration to believe that its
attempts to democratize Afghanistan and
Iraq should have been successful. Since
WWII America has successfully democratized two states: Japan and West Germany.
Both of these democracies emerged from
war-ravaged countries after having been previously ruled by authoritarian governments.
Democratization occurred in both places despite a recent cult-of-personality surrounding
the former leader as well (particularly salient
for Iraqi reconstruction). Furthermore, since
these countries democratized, neither had
been involved in an international conflict.
In fact, since WWII, Japan has not developed an official offensive military (albeit,
this tradition sprang from provisions established in a Constitution drawn up by American military officials (Ike 1950, 24)). If the
United States could harness the characteristics of successful democratization in Japan
and West Germany, perhaps it would be possible to turn Afghanistan and Iraq into democracies as well.
Taken at face value, the reasons for,
the Bush administration’s invasions of Iraq
and Afghanistan are fairly reasonable.
States, unlike amorphous terrorist groups,
are easily identifiable and targetable by the
military. The services these states provided
to al Qaeda could be reduced or eliminated
entirely through regime change. Democratization, had it been carried out properly,
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could have further reduced the potential for terrorism.
The Shortcomings of
Democratization
With such a theoretically sound theory for democratization, why has democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan been a hindrance to the War on Terror? The answer is
lies in how democratization has been shaped
by political elites to define success in the
two countries. In Afghanistan, after the initial invasion, the United States spent most of
its time fighting against Taliban in the hills
of Afghanistan. The United States correctly
believed that by creating a secure environment in Afghanistan, it would be more likely
that a democratic government could flourish
(Fukuyama 2006, 234). However, neither the
safe environment nor democracy ever
emerged. To this day that United States
military continues to fight against Taliban
and al Qaeda forces throughout Afghanistan.
The fighting is so intense that in late March
2009, President Barak Obama ordered an
additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to
“partner with Afghan security forces and go
after insurgents along the border” (Obama
2009). Because of this instability, the Afghan national government has yet to gain
control over the whole country. Facing internal insurrection, a burgeoning illegal drug
trade, and a lack of infrastructure, Afghanistan has been unable to develop into the democracy necessary for DPT to take effect.
Democracy has become the single criteria
for victory in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it
has proven elusive.
As discussed earlier, before the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the United States used the
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presence of WMDs and the association of
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as a
casus belli. So certain was the United States
that it would encounter weapons of mass
destruction during the invasion that media
personnel were imbedded into American
military squadrons (Galbraith 2006, 86—
87). However, after the invasion, in an international investigation by members of the
Coalition of the Willing to determine if Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs at the time
of the invasion. The report came back negative (Duelfer 2004). Internationally embarrassed and responsible for a failed state, the
United States began to democratize Iraq.
Admittedly, Iraq needed reconstruction independent of the presence or absence of weapons of mass destruction. However, for lack
of any other legitimate reason for the invasion, the U.S. turned to democratization as
the criteria for success. Thus, democratization, while a theoretically sound means of
encouraging peace, has become an excuse
for a continued American presence in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It is this continued presence that has caused serious damage to the
ability of the United States to wage the War
on Terror.
The Problems of Continued United States
Presence
Angry Afghanistan, Infuriated Iraq
One of the most obvious problems
resulting from a continued U.S. presence
based on democratization has been the anger
aroused in Iraqi and Afghani citizens. Instead of being greeted, as Vice President
Richard Cheney predicted, as “liberators,”
Coalition troops have been met with intense
and overt hostility. It is far outside the
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scope of this essay to discuss the
legitimacy of this anger. However,
suffice to say that it exists, and it has
a significant impact on how Iraq and
Afghanistan have undergone democratic changes. It should be noted that anger is not necessarily just a negative element in state building. In fact, history has
shown that anger can be used as a catalyst
for regime change. However, anger, particularly when anger causes violence, makes the
emergence of democratic institutions much
less likely (Electing to Fight). As the United
States continues its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan on the grounds that a democratic state
will eventually emerge, this anger is counterproductive for achieving American objectives.
The emergence of religiously motivated political parties and ethnic separatist
movements must be considered regarding
their impact on democratization. Rather
than address the specific goals of particular
organizations, it is most useful to group
them together when analyzing their impact
on democratization efforts. For example,
while one group may want an Iraqi Sunni
state while another may desire a free Kursdish state, the most important aspect of these
groups is that they all inhibit the ability of
the US to engage in state-building, and have
damaged Iraqi or Afghani conceptions of
national unity.
Although the amount of money and
manpower spent on private contractors to
rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan has been immense, by far the United States military has
played the largest role in reconstruction.
Not only has the American military engaged
in civil reconstruction, but its efforts to pro-
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vide security to the two countries are indispensible for the emergence of democratic
states. Although there is no clear, universal
answer as to precisely what is needed and in
what order conditions need to emerge to create democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder (from whom my definition for democratization was taken) have written extensively since 1995 regarding the ordering of
democratic institutions necessary for democracy to emerge. These two scholars argue in
their book Electing to Fight that without the
development of democratic institutions there
can be no security, and thus, democracy,
much less DPT, will not function. Others
may claim that without security there can be
no democratic institutions, obviously inhibiting democracy (Forman 2006, 196). No
matter which side of this chicken—egg debate the reader falls, suffice to say that security is an crucial element important part to
the state building process.
Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier
in this essay, terrorist attack methodology is
remarkable for its simplicity, destructive capability and inability to be detected. Thus,
despite its superior weaponry and training,
one of the greatest threats to the American
military in Iraq and Afghanistan has been
terrorist attacks. Roadside bombs and small
arms fire are a constant problem for the
American military, and the costs of carrying
out these attacks as opposed to preventing
them seriously favors the attacker over the
victim (Howard 2009, 113). Thus, while the
United States has pegged victory in the War
on Terror on the emergence of democracy in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is attempting to create democracy in an environment extremely
hostile to the American presence.
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Now consider how all of this
within the context of the emergence
of religiously motivated political organizations and separatist movements
on democratization. These two types
of organizations are considered linked in
this essay because they share an important
characteristic: they both tend to reject US
involvement in state development. In Iraq,
separatist movements cannot support US
efforts because, at present, the US is not attempting to break up the Iraqi state. Admittedly, this is not always the case. Until
2006, prior to the Bush administration’s
troop “surge” in which an additional 30,000
troops were deployed to Iraq, the idea of a
three state system was very possible. This is
exemplified by the January 2005 referendum
in which Iraqis in the Northern Kurdish region voted for their independence from the
rest of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006, 193) Even
though the Kurds in Northern Iraq had been
an invaluable asset to the United States during the 2003 invasion, allowing the region to
secede from the Iraqi state was an untenable
solution for the Bush administration and the
Maliki government. To allow a portion of
Iraq to remove itself from the negotiating
table regarding Iraqi reconstruction could
have opened the floodgates for secession by
other groups.
Afghanistan is in a different situation, but one no less hindered by separatist
organizations. To fully grasp the difference,
it should be recognized that the American
invasion in 2001 was done with significant
assistance by native Afghanis. The United
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UFI, and known to Western media as
the “Northern Alliance”) had worked exten-
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sively with the United States and Great
Britian during the 2001 invasion. Immediately following the capture of Kabul, the
UFI packed government positions with its
cadres (Weinbaum 2006, 127). However, the
ethnic composition of the North Alliance
was such that it was dominated by Tajiks,
Panjshiris, and Uzbeks; all relative minorities in Afghanistan. Absent from the alliance, and thus, the new government, were
Pashtuns and Shia Muslim Hazaras which
were the largest groups in Afghanistan, but
whose members resided in eastern and
southern parts of the country. As the Afghan bureaucracy became occupied by
Northern Alliance loyalists, warlords from
southern and eastern Afghanistan began to
see perceive the newly formed Afghan government as illegitimate (Weinbaum 2006,
129). Thus, while the United States concerned itself with security in Afghanistan,
the Afghan national government proved ineffective at governing in areas much beyond
Kabul.
As for the specific dangers posed to
democratization by religiously motivated
political parties, distrust among Sunni and
Shiites in Iraq almost caused a breakup of
the state (Galbraith, 2006, 181-208). Iraqis
Shiites, the majority Muslim faction in Iraq,
had been the dominant force in drafting the
Iraqi Constitution. Of course, Shiite dominance of the constitutional process was unacceptable to Sunni Iraqis who, with the DeBaathification of the Iraqi government, had
already begun to see democratization as a
not-so-subtle effort to remove Sunnis from
the governing process. Furthermore, attempts by the Sunnis to take control of the
government through democratic reform
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were viewed by many former
Ba’athists as a threat to their power.
This caused Sunni representatives to
object to “nearly everything that was
proposed,” (Galbraith 2006, 194) Subsequent attempts by the United States by
the United States to pacify Sunni dissent
ostracized the Shiite majority who felt that
America was not really interested in forming
a genuine democracy. Religious political
parties were the logical outcome. They
acted a the perfect venue for Sunnis to extend their political control over the process.
As a minority group, political power was at
a premium of importance.
With power concentrated in a few
groups, and with the groups competing for
power, sectarian violence erupted on a horrific scale. Sunni groups attacked Shiia
groups and vice versa. With each attack
came retaliations. Bigger attacks yielded
bigger retaliation. The massive upswing in
sectarian violence after the 2006 bombing of
the al Askari Mosque is an excellent example of the blood feud that consumed Iraq Retaliations were common. It is believed that
the bombing was the immediate cause of as
many as 165 deaths, and most likely contributed to the upswing in violence that occurred
for the months after the attack where average deaths per day rose from 11 to 34.
(Galbraith 2006, 246) The violence was so
prominent, a US intelligence reports released
as late as August 2007 noted the disturbing
frequency of sectarian violence as a major
obstacle in establishing peace in Iraq.
Essentially, the political motivated
religious groups and the separatist movements were fulfilling the gap in civil society
generated by the destruction of the old re-
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gimes. Civil society is the lifeblood of democracy. Ashutosh Varshney , a scholar on
ethnic conflict and civic life, defines civil
society as “the part of our life that exists between the state on one hand and families on
the other that allows people to come together
on a variety of issues (2002, 4). Without the
connections made through civil society,
Varshney posits that the potential for violence in communities will increase. Although Varshney wrote these words of wisdom regarding the relationships between
Hindus and Muslims in India, the same
statement could easily be applied to Sunnis,
Shi’a and Kurds in Iraq, or Tajiks and Pashtuns in Afghanistan. Without civil society
there is violence, and as violence increases,
the likelihood of democratization decreases.
The Poppy Production Dilemma
The inability to administer governance on the part of the Afghan national government has enabled a massive upswing in
the production of poppy in parts of Afghanistan. Afghanistan possess little arable land.
Rocky, dry, and lacking even basic infrastructures in some regions, it is very difficult
for Afghan farmers to scratch out a living.
Because of the inhospitable climate, Afghan’s main agricultural products are limited
essentially to the few things that can grow
easily. Among these are certain types of
nuts, figs, and poppy. Poppy, a plant from
which opium cam be extracted, is used in the
production of many types of narcotics such
as heroin and morphine. These drugs are
intensely lucrative, and their production
poses a serious concern for the fledgling Afghani government. Lawlessness and poor
infrastructure makes the logistics of curtailing the production of poppy very difficult.

121
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/10

12

Duhe: Imposing Democracy

Great Day 2009
Nevertheless, the unmitigated production of these goods can be very
harmful. Drugs production and sale
are a problem for any government, particularly those with poor domestic support facilities (rehabilitation centers, public health care clinics, etc.). Furthermore,
the sale of poppy has been linked to narcoterrorism, and is a chief element in terrorist
funding (Weinbaum 2006, 133). Ironically,
during the reign of the Taliban, poppy production had been outlawed. However, after
the Northern Alliance came to power, and
certainly after the Northern alliance lost the
ability to administer government across Afghanistan, poppy production has reached an
all-time high (Weinbaum 2006, 126). Thus,
the United States and the newly formed Afghan government finds itself in the tenuous
position of both needing to stop the production of a crop that can by synthesized into a
controlled substance, and the need for farmers to subsist. The United States has placed
itself in a no—win situation regarding poppy
production. If the United States destroys
poppy crops to discourage narco-terrorism, it
harms the wellbeing of Afghan farmers
thereby decreasing the likelihood of the
emergence of a middle class and harming
democratization (Moore 1966, xxii). If the
United States allows the poppy crops to
grow, previous efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are undermined. No matter what it
does, America is hemorrhages resources. A
continued American presence based on the
emergence of a democratic state will only
prolong the bleeding.
Unending Investment
The central theme of this paper is
how continued American presence in Iraq
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and Afghanistan in the name of democratization has reduced the ability of the United
States to wage the War on Terror. A
strained and previously engaged military,
damaged American confidence in political
leadership, and the accumulation of massive
debt from invasion and reconstruction all
reduced the ability of the United States to
respond to future dangers. In this section, I
will explore how and why these costs have
accumulated.
Speaking in fiscal terms, the war has
cost Americans a phenomenal sum of
money. In a Congressional report released
October 15, 2008, Congress admitted to allocating almost one trillion dollars to fighting the War on Terror (including all invasion
and reconstruction activity in Afghanistan
and Iraq) (United State Congress Congressional Report Service 2008, 16). This number is incredible. It is almost one thirteenth
of average annual American GDP
(Purchasing Power Parity) in 2007 (World
Bank, 2007). Some critics of the War on
Terror even claim this number is deflated.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel—prize winning
economist, claims the costs of the war could
actually be as high as $4 trillion
(HERSZENHORN, 2008) To appreciate
these numbers, think of how this money was
not used. Even if the money was still only
used to reduce the threat of terrorism, there
were certainly other, better, uses for it. By
comparison, between 2003 and 2007, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) received appropriations
from Congress in the amount of $5 billion
dollars (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 3). This is not to
suggest that economic development is a
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suitable alternative from democratization in the War on Terror. However, by providing humanitarian assistance, the United States might at least
have reduced the animosity many in
Iraq and Afghanistan feel towards the
United States. Had Iraq and Afghanistan
turned into model democracies, these costs
may have been bearable. However, this has
not been the case.
The United States military has also
suffered as a result of its democratization
efforts. The U.S. military is engaged in tasks
for which it was not designed. American
soldiers predominantly trained for combat
environments, not the sort of peacekeeping
missions necessary for state building and
reconstruction (Dobbins 2006, 223). As
mentioned earlier, the US military did possess a few resources that would be helpful
for democratization such as the Army Corps
of Engineers for assistance in creating civil
infrastructure. However, these efforts have
obviously proven insufficient. The sheer
quantity of money that has been spent on
private contractors and by Nongovernmental
organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a
testament to this deficiency.
The credibility of American political
elites has also suffered immensely because
of the continued American presence in these
two countries. In the immediate aftermath of
9-11, President George Bush experienced
record approval ratings; what many considered to be a manifestation of the “rally
‘round the flag” effect (Muller 2005, 47). In
the run up to the war in Iraq, the Bush administration received another spike in approval. However, as the conflicts dragged
on, as American expenses and casualties

mounted, and as the amount of time necessary for successful democratization became
clearer, American public opinion waned. A
poll conducted by CBS asked 844 American
adults nationwide, "Do you think the result
of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of
American life and other costs of attacking
Iraq, or not?" In August 2003, 46% of those
surveyed said that they believed the costs
were worth the results while 45% thought
the costs were not worth it with 9% unsure
(CBS News Poll, 2009). In March of 2008,
CBS polled the same group and discovered
that according to their survey, support had
gone down significantly. In March 2008,
only 29% of those surveyed though the costs
were worth it while those who believed the
results were not worth the costs rose to 64%
of those surveyed with 7% unsure. This
negative sentiment was directly reflected in
American views of President Bush. In a
Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International asked
1,003 adults nationwide, “. . . Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the situation in Iraq?" In May 2003,
less than one month after the initial invasion
of Iraq, 69% of Americans said that they approved of the Bush administration’s handling, while only 26% disapproved with 5%
not sure. In August 2005, over two years
later, American views had obviously
changed. Again, Princeton Survey Research
Associates International conducted the poll.
This time, 34% of Americans approved,
61% disapproved, and 5% were unsure. At
the end of the second Bush term, the same
poll found 68% of Americans disapproved
of Bush’s handling of Iraq (Newsweek Poll
conducted by Princeton Survey Research
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Associates International, 2009).
One popularly cited reason for why
Americans stopped favoring the war
and supporting American military leadership is “casualty phobia”(Feaver
Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8). This argument state argues that there may be initial
support for the use of force, but the support
evaporates rapidly and irrevocably at the
sight of body bags.” (Feaver Gelpi and
Reifler 2009, 8). This certainly seems logical. As the criteria for American victory in
Iraq and Afghanistan was made unattainable,
each life lost in the conflicts became more
deplorable. Obviously, as the United States
prolongs its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for
the sake of democratization, it is likely that
the credibility of political elites may suffer
further damage.
But what has enabled the hemorrhaging of American dollars, lives, and domestic
credibility in the name of democratization?
The answer lies in the epistemological ambiguity of important terms in the War on Terror. Few American politicians stood against
the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. To do
so would have been political suicide in a democratic society. Similarly, in the weeks
leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, few
politicians stood against the Bush administration. The stakes for being wrong were
simply perceived as too high by most politicians (Ravi 2005, 55). Because of this uniform political support, the Bush administration introduced a number of terms into the
discussion of the War on Terror. Two of the
most important terms for this discussion
were “victory” and “democracy.” On May
2, 2003, U.S. President George Bush landed
in full fighter regalia on the deck of the
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U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. The purpose of
President Bush’s visit to the Abraham Lincoln was to declare as the banner behind him
said, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished.” As
is now known all too well, the mission was
not yet finished. Nevertheless, the Bush administration made wining military campaigns against Iraq seem like the only criteria for a successful invasion (Ravi 2005, 45).
However, when weapons inspectors concluded Iraq never possessed a WMD program, the Bush administration changed
“victory” again. This time, victory took the
current definition of a fully democratic Iraq.
Of course, there no explanation was ever
provided about exactly what a fully democratic Iraq meant. Internationally accepted
free and fair elections? High voter registration and participation? The Bush administration never explained. Despite this ambiguity, in a November 30, 2005 address
where he discussed strategy for the war in
Iraq, George Bush used the term “victory”
15 times, and even posed a sign that said,
“Plan for Victory” next to his podium
(Berinsky Drukman, 2007, 128) Even
though the definition for victory had
changed, it was clear that the Bush administration still expected it. On a similar note,
the Bush administration remained steadfast
against the use of timetables for withdrawal
from the two countries, and because of its
precarious position, was unable to ensure the
developing Iraqi government reached Washington-approved checkpoints. When Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections were
postponed from 2004 until 2005, the United
States could only watch (United Nations Information Service 2005). Removing support
for the nascent Afghani national
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government would not have
yielded faster democratization. All
that the United States could do was
keep promoting security in Afghanistan
and hope for better election conditions
in 2005.
Unfriendly Friends
The Bush administration did a spectacular
job of alienating U.S. allies throughout the
War on Terror. Immediately following 9-11,
nations around the world flocked to America’s support. From long time allies like
Britain to countries with which the U.S. has
had cooler relations such as Iran and Libya,
international solidarity against the hijackings
was astounding. Immediately after the attack, the nineteen members of NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
stating, that “an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them
all.” The members of NATO went even further by pledging action including the “use of
armed force.” (Gordon 2002, 5) However,
two and a half years later, in the weeks leading up to the United States invasion of Iraq,
relations between the United States and its
allies soured.
Prior to the war, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
United Nations Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
had been investigating Iraq. These organizations are international bodies charged with
investigating countries possessing nuclear
technology for their compliance with international law. In the case of Iraq the IAEA
and UNMOVIC were responsible for investigating Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.
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Resolution 1441 offered Saddam Hussein a
final opportunity to have Iraq comply with
previous United Nations Security Council
resolutions restricting Iraq’s possession of
both a nuclear material and certain prohibited armament in the wake of the 1991 Gulf
War (The United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1441, 2009). However, the investigation of Iraq was not fast enough for
the Bush administration. Citing Iraqi unwillingness to allow inspectors into certain
areas, the Bush administration claimed that
Iraq was not fully disclosing its weapons
program and was therefore in contravention
of Resolution 1441 (Galbraith 2006, 102).
The Resolution contained no specific triggers for military action. Nevertheless, U.S.
representative to the United Nations John
Negroponte did comment that, “If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the
event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state
from acting to defend itself against the threat
posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN
resolutions and protect world peace security.” It was Negroponte’s caveat that would
later be used by the Bush administration as a
justification for the Iraq invasion.
The international community was not
supportive of U.S. military action in Iraq.
Particularly after IAEA and UNMOVIC investigators presented evidence for Iraqi
compliance to Resolution 1441, the international community saw U.S. militarism as
disconcerting (Wall, 125). Although the
United States would claim that it assembled
a “Coalition of the Willing” to support it
during a war with Iraq, the coalition was
strongly influenced by bribes and coercion
by the United States (Anderson Bennis and
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Cavanagh 2003, 8—10). Those
countries that were not part of the
“Coalition” were ostracized, in many
cases by the American public itself.
France in particular experienced American rancor through boycotts of French
products, jokes focusing on French military
cowardice, and even childish renaming of
items that contained the word “French” (i.e.
“french fries” became “freedom fries”).
None of this is good for utilizing the international goodwill created after 9-11. For their
part, “The French see a new aggressive
strain of messianic universalism in U.S. policy, a willingness to impose democracy by
use of the U.S. military.” which they see as
deeply troubling (Wall 2004, 126). As the
United States continues its presence in Iraq
and Afghanistan because of a dedication to
the emergence of democracy, this view is
unlikely to change.
Policy Prescriptions
Given these grotesque realities, what
steps should the Obama administration take
to correct America’s course in fighting the
War on Terror? The answer to this is in
three parts. First, the United States must
extricate itself from the politics of Iraq and
Afghanistan as much as possible. Secondly,
the US must reducing instances of overt hostility towards Muslims within US military
practices. Finally, the Obama administration
needs to work to heal relationships between
the US and the international community
while convincing the international community to share the burden of state building
when necessary. These three tactics will address the major obstacles to the War on Terror that have arisen as a result of attempts by
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the United States to democratize Iraq and
Afghanistan. These recommendations are a
start. Had the Bush administration undertaken these policies in the early days of the
two invasions, it is unlikely that conditions
would have degenerated as seriously as they
have. Thus, the impacts of these actions are
likely to carry repercussions that may not
have necessarily have occurred if implemented sooner. The above prescriptions are
likely to encounter serious problems in implementation. However, “obstacles on the
ground” must be addressed one way or another if the United States seeks to correct its
mistakes
It is important to mention that as of
this writing, the Obama administration has
taken several significant steps towards many
of these goals. However, much more work
is needed before the ill—effects of attempts
to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq can be
eradicated. As President, Barack Hussein
Obama (a Democrat, America’s first black
President, and a man with Muslim family) is
in a unique position to shape how the United
States fights the War on Terror. Now, the
only question that remains is if he is up to
the challenge.
American removal from Iraqi and
Afghani governance is critical. Without this,
all other measures to fix the problems generated by these democratizations may be fruitless. At a basic level, governments must
concern themselves with two things: legitimacy and sovereignty. Lacking either of
these things will result in the devolution of
society into lawlessness. Without sovereignty, governments are unable to control
citizens. Without legitimacy, constant internal power struggles will make a unified
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government impossible. While its
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan
may assist in governmental sovereignty (the United States military has
extensively trained local Afghanis and
Iraqis in combat and security measures
(Obama, 2009)) it has hindered governmental legitimacy in the process. With separatist
groups and religiously motivated political
groups jockeying for power, such chinks in
legitimacy of the new governments with
weak civil societies may be fatal.
While it may not be feasible for the
United States to quickly and completely divorce itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it can
certainly start by removing itself from much
of the politics of the two countries. The
Obama administration must develop a list of
objectives the United States will pursue in
these countries, and fulfill them at the discretion of the host governments. Furthermore, these goals need to be apolitical and
object goods for all Iraqis and Afghanis. A
good example of this is security. Simultaneously, the United States must create a list of
goals and it expects the Iraqi and Afghani
governments to accomplish. These goals
must be reasonable and they also must be
accompanied by reasonable timetables. Despite its weaknesses in fighting terrorism,
the United States military is certainly more
capable of upholding security than the infant
governments. Furthermore, if the United
States enforces security everywhere equally,
not just in areas that are friendly toward
America, the potential for harming the legitimacy of indigenous governments may diminish. However, the Iraqi and Afghani governments must work diligently towards democracy for American efforts to be fruitful.
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Interestingly, if this policy is undertaken, it
is likely that American objectives and Iraqi
and Afghani objectives may sync on a number of key issues. Both the Iraq and United
States governments want al Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) agents apprehended. Working with
the Iraqi government may be the best way to
achieve this, while simultaneously making it
more difficult for AQI to gain supporters
who are against the US presence. By creating delineating responsibilities and goals,
the United States will be providing strong
support to democratization, but in such a
way that it will more likely result in a full
democracy.
A serious blunder of the Bush administration was the impact of American
counterterrorist activity on the perceptions
of Muslims around the world. The problem
was so significant that one of the major focuses of President Obama’s first trip abroad
was to assure the “Muslim world” that the
United States, “is not and will never be at
war with Islam” (Cooper, 2009). Of course,
soundbites from President Obama may not
be sufficient to outweigh Muslim antipathy.
Overt targeting of Islam and Muslims in the
War on Terror have scarred American relations with many Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, 2009).
To correct its course, the United States must
not allow further cause to those who think
the United States is at war with Islam.
Obama has made significant strides in this
regard. Closing the infamous American
military base and prisoner detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is an excellent first
step. As discussed, intentionally removing
the phrase “War on terror” from the lexicon
of American foreign policy is another step
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in the right direction. These efforts
must be continued if the United
States is ever to win back the public
opinion of Muslims around the world.
Finally, the United States must work
to reintegrate the international community
into the War on Terror. America had widespread international support after 9-11.
However, the costs of involvement to America combined with American pomposity
have made it unlikely for other countries to
volunteer in the War on Terror. Contributing to this unease is the knowledge that
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain and
chief supporter of the United States during
the Iraqi Invasion, received so much domestic backlash that he lost his position as PM.
Similarly, politicians in countries like Australia and Spain came to power with promises that they would remove their country
from the Coalition. This is obviously a
problem for the United States which already
supplies the majority of resources for the
two conflicts. President Obama’s charge
will thus be twofold for reintegrating the international community into the War on Terror. First, he will need to convince politicians that they will not necessarily loose
popular support just by assisting in the War.
Second (although related), President Obama
needs to impress upon the international community that fighting terrorists must be a concern of every country. If Barack Obama can
get more countries in the world invested in
the notion of preventing terrorist attacks,
then proving that politicians will not lose
domestic support will come naturally. Without the international involvement in the War
on Terror, costs to Americans will be much
higher, and the likelihood for success will be
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much lower.
Conclusion
In this essay I have shown how democratization has harmed the ability of the
United States to wage the War on Terror.
Theoretically, democratization may have
been the solution for rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan after the United States invaded.
However, poor planning, and insufficient
resources have stymied the emergence of
democratic institutions in these two states.
Despite this slowness in democratization,
political elites have defined victory in these
two countries as the emergence of fully democratic governments. This decision has
angered many indigenous Iraqis and Afghanis, necessitated enormous and continual
resource investment from the United States,
and has tarnished U.S. image internationally.
Despite these issues, American policy can be
corrected. The Obama administration must
work to differentiate the War on Terror from
what many Muslims perceive as a “War on
Islam.” Furthermore, the Obama administration must develop concrete criteria for victory and abide by those criteria for committing a judicious withdrawal from Iraq and
Afghanistan. Finally, the Obama administration must involve other countries in the
War on Terror. This is important both because it will enable the United States to defer some of the expenses of the War on other
countries, but also because the goals of the
War on Terror are beneficial to all states.
These tasks will be difficult to achieve, but
not impossible. By halting America’s tireless commitment to democratization in Iraq
and Afghanistan, in the long run, the United
States will be in a much better position to
wage the War on Terror.

128
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

19

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 10

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

Cooper, Helene. America Seeks Bonds to
Islam, Obama Insists. The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/world/
Scott L. Althaus, Devon M. Largio. De- europe/07prexy.html?partner=rss&emc=rss
cember 8, 2004. When Osama Became (Accessed 9 April, 2009)
Saddam: Origins and Consequences of
the Change in America’s Public Enemy
Dobins, James. 2006, Learning the Lessons
#1. PS Online. http://
of Iraq In Nation Building: Beyond Afwww.communication.illinois.edu/salthaus/ ghanistan and Iraq Edited by Francis Fukualthaus.pdf. (Accessed 10 March, 2009)
yama. Johns Hopkins University Press: Bal-

References

Baker, Peter. The Words Have Changed,
but Have the Policies? The New York
Times Online. http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/us/politics
(Accessed 5 April, 2009)
Adam J. Berinsky, James N. Drukman.2007.THE POLLS—REVIEW . Public
Opinion Quarterly.Vol. 71 Issue 1, 126—
141.
Bhutto, Benazir. 2008. Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West. Harper Perennial: New York

timore
Dodge, Toby. The Causes of US Failure in
Iraq. Survival. Volume 49, Number 1. 85—
106. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/
content~content=a773453684~db=all
(Accessed 12 April, 2009)
Duelfer, Charles.Comprehensive Report of
the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's
WMD. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/
general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/
index.html. (Accessed 10 February, 2009)

Edward Mansfield, Jack Snyder. 2007 ElectByman, Daniel. 2009. US Counter-terrorism ing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies
Options: A Taxonomy In Terrorism and
Go to War. MIT Press: Cambridge, MassaCounter Terrorism: Understanding the New chusetts
Security Environment. 2009 by Russell D.
Forman, Johanna Mendelson. Striking Out in
Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, Natasha E BaBaghdad: How Postconflict Reconstruction
jema. and Barry R. McCafrey. McGraw Hill: Went Awry In Nation Building: Beyond AfBoston
ghanistan and Iraq Edited by Francis Fukuyama. Johns Hopkins University Press: BalCBS News Poll. "Do you think the result of timore
the war with Iraq was worth the loss of
American life and other costs of attacking
Fukuyama, Francis. 2006. Nation Building:
Iraq, or not?" http://
Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. Johns Hopwww.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm. (Accessed kins University Press: Baltimore
13 April 2009)

129
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/10

20

Duhe: Imposing Democracy

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

Peter D. Feaver, Christopher Gelpi,
and Jason Reifler. 2009. Paying the
Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military
Conflicts. Princeton University Press:
Princeton

Howard, Russell D. 2009. The New Terrorism. In Terrorism and Counter Terrorism:
Understanding the New Security Environment. 2009 by Russell D. Howard, Reid L.
Sawyer, Natasha E. Bajema. and Barry R.

Galbraith, Peter W. 2006. The End of Iraq:
How American Incompetence Created A
War Without End. Simon and Schuster, Incorporated: New York

McCafrey. McGraw Hill: Boston
Ike, Nobutaka. [1950] 1969. The Beginnings
of Political Democracy in Japan. New York:
Greenwood Press Publishers

Lawrence, Wright. 2006. The Looming
Gause III, Gregory F. September/October
Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Ran2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism? For- dom House: New York
eign Affairs Magazine
London School of Economics. 2004. What is
Civil Society? http://www.lse.ac.uk/
Goodson, Larry P. 2006. The Lessons of Na- collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm.
tion-Building in Afghanistan In Nation
Created March 1, 2004 (Accessed 26 April,
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq Ed- 2009)
ited by Francis Fukuyama. Johns Hopkins
University Press: Baltimore
Moore, Barrington Jr. 1966. Social Origins
of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
Gordon, Philip H. NATO After 11 Septem- Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.
ber. Survival. Volume 43. Number 4. http:// Beacon Press: Boston
www.brookings.edu/views/Articles/
Gordon/2002wintersurvival.pf. (Accessed 9 Moneten, Jonathan. Spring 2005. The Roots
of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism,
February, 2009)
and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy.
Herszenhorn, David M. Estimates of Iraq
International Security. Volume 29. Issue 4.
War Cost Were Not Close to Ballpark.
112—156
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/
washington. (Accessed 4 February, 2009)
Mueller, John. November/December 2005.
The Iraq Syndrome. Foreign Affairs MagaHoffman, Bruce. 2006. Defining Terrorism zine. Volume 84. Issue 6. 44—54
In Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: UnderNewsweek Poll conducted by Princeton Surstanding the New Security Environment.
vey Research Associates International.". . .
2009 by Russell D. Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, Natasha E Bajema. and Barry R. McCa- Do you approve or disapprove of the way
Bush is handling the situation in Iraq?"
frey. McGraw Hill: Boston
www.pollingreport.com/iraq3.htm. Created
July 11-12, 2007. (Accessed 13 April,

Published by KnightScholar, 2010

130
21

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2009 [2010], Art. 10

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Ray Takeyh,
Do Terrorist Networks Need A
Home? In Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment. 2009 by Russell D.
Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, Natasha E Bajema. and Barry R. McCafrey. McGraw
Hill: Boston

and International Organizations. W.W. Norton and Company: New York

Obama, Barack. REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON A NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-NewStrategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/.
(Accessed 3 April, 2009)

United Nations Security Council. United
National Information Service in Vienna.
March 23, 2005. Mid-September Earliest
Possible Date for Afghanistan Parliamentary Elections, Special Representative Tells
Security Council. Pub. No. SC/8339
United Nations Security Council. UN Security Council Resolution 1441. http://
www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/
unscr1441.htm. (Accessed 3 February, 2009)
United States Congress. Congressional
Budget Office. 2008. Contractors’ Support
for US Operations in Iraq. Pub. No. 3053

Minxin Pie, Samia Amin , and Seth Garz.
Building Nations: The American Experience
In Nation Building: Beyond Afghanistan and United States Congress. Congressional ReIraq (2006) Edited by Francis Fukuyama.
search Service. October 15, 2008. The Cost
Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War
on Terror Operations Since 9/11. Order
Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Code RL33110
Center. America's Image Slips, But Allies
Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas No United States Office of Homeland Security.
Global Warming Alarm in the U.S., China: July 2002. National Strategy for Homeland
America's Image and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Security. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
http://pewglobal.org/reports. (Accessed 24
assets/nat_strat_hls.pdf (Accessed 15 April ,
March, 2009)
2009)
Ravi, Narasimhan. 2005. Looking beyond
Flawed Journalism: How National Interests,
Patriotism, and Cultural Values Shaped the
Coverage of the Iraq War. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 10,
No. 1, 45—62

Varshney, Ashutosh 2002. Ethnic Conflict
and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. New Haven: Yale University Press
Wall, Irwin M. Winter/Spring 2004. The
French—American War Over Iraq. Volume
10. Issue 2. 123—139

Bruce Russett, John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence

131
https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2009/iss1/10

22

Duhe: Imposing Democracy

Great Day 2009

SUNY Geneseo

Weinbaum, Marvin G. 2006. Rebuilding Afghanistan: Impediments,
Lessons, and Prospects In Nation
Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq
Edited by Francis Fukuyama. Johns
Hopkins University Press: Baltimore
World Bank. 2007. Gross Domestic Product
2007, PPP. http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/
GDP_PPP.pdf. (Accessed 3 February, 2009)

132
Published by KnightScholar, 2010

23

